Right where it started.
In a sense, the 2023-2024 season was over well before it began. It would be difficult to characterize the firing of Brad Larsen as a mistake but it was perhaps a symptom of the greater dysfunction plaguing the Blue Jackets organization.
That dysfunction, of ineffective leadership from the top, reared it’s head quite early into the offseason. Larsen was removed and, before Adam Fantilli had even joined the organization, rumors surrounding Mike Babcock swirled around the club.
In a recent interview, Zach Werenski lamented the clubs inability to escape the cycle of mistakes. One player tries a risky pass on the breakout, the next tries to make up for the bobbling puck with a deke in the neutral zone. Instead of accepting a small loss the mistakes compounded and the other team left with a dramatic advantage.
Compounding Mistakes
That’s probably the best way to describe Jarmo Kekelainen’s offseason.
Replacing Nick Foligno, David Savard and Cam Atkinson as leaders with Boone Jenner, Erik Gudbranson and Jake Voracek set the table for a room without the appropriate meshing of skill/work. Further compounded by the eventual replacement of Oliver Bjorkstrand and Gustav Nyquist (mostly lost to injury) with Johnny Gaudreau.
The veteran leadership was simply downgraded. Smart, thoughtful, personable leaders were replaced with grinders and “good pros”. The mix of soft skill, work ethic and personable leadership had been replaced by players who were siloed within a single domain. All of this to say, it looked like the Blue Jackets were a rebuilding club and Larsen looked like he was piloting one in 2022-2023.
Unfortunately, Jarmo Kekelainen desired different results, he was “sick and tired of losing.”
Where under Larsen rookies went from insulated to drowned (Sillinger’s most common linemates went from Gustav Nyquist, Oliver Bjorkstrand and Jake Voracek to Kent Johnson and Jack Roslovic) now was the time to trade future assets so that the team could rise from the depths that landed them Adam Fantilli.
Ivan Provorov and Damon Severson are, depending on your definition, good players. Spending significant assets, a 1st (in a historically deep draft) and 2nd for a cap-retained Provorov and a 3rd for the privilege of signing Severson to a lucrative UFA contract was certainly a choice.
In one sense, perhaps now we won’t be drowning our young forwards with poor defense and we’ll have a veteran partner or two for the brightly talented crop of young defensemen. In reality, that wasn’t really how it played out and, in all honesty, the roster was only part of the issue with this season.
The issue was that those moves were made in an effort to woo Mike Babcock. The front office consulted their network and everyone said good things, including Rick Nash the new, bright, young mind in management.
He had a mental health plan! He worked with the youth! His daughter taught him that sometimes what he meant wasn’t at all what he said, no wait, it was that the youth didn’t understand what he was saying, “message sent isn’t message received.”
While the coach was fired before the season started, and Pascal Vincent tossed amiably from the frying pan to the fire, the disfunction still remained at the top and Mike Babcock still had plenty of time to put a death grip on the season.
Jarmo Kekelainen layered mistake with mistake all in the pursuit of short-changing a rebuild that he guaranteed with his All-In Deadline that culminated in the sweep of Tampa Bay.
We’re Going to do it Vegas Style
Mike Babcock consulted with the analytics team and discovered the differences between non-playoff teams and playoff teams. Most people would call it offseason research and development but Babcock liked “rob and do” better. They certainly did rob, but I don’t think they’ve quite found the “do” yet.
Essentially, the Blue Jackets stole the defensive system of Boston and Vegas, two perennial winners and implemented it to disastrous results. I wouldn’t say this was entirely Babcock’s doing, if we believe him it aligns with Pascal Vincent’s preferred style as well, considering some of the comments made by the front office well into the season.
Members of the front office have since expressed a unique affectation directed towards Vegas and the hiring of Babcock, and comments about desired attributes in coaches, may have been intended to resemble Bruce Cassidy (nevermind Boston’s player comments of delight, and extremely high regular season performance, after hiring a more positively inclined coach in Jim Montgomery).
In a sense, the young, rebuilding club was simply going to play the conservative, defense focused zone system that brought continued success to those organizations over the years.
In my eyes, that was a clear mistake. The Blue Jackets are a roster filled with young, aggressive players who are still very much learning the NHL. Vegas was one of the oldest and heaviest teams in the NHL. Columbus was one of the youngest.
Furthermore, some of the Blue Jackets best offensive players (Gaudreau and Kent Johnson) don’t look anything like the usually very large forwards on Vegas. As far as small forwards go, they don’t really play like Brad Marchand or Johnathan Marchessault either.
The Blue Jackets could not have been more different.
But honestly? All of that is okay. There’s no reason that a certain system can’t work, especially if it will be the direction of your club for the near future. It’s pretty much everything after that was completely rancid.
The Distinct Lack of Vegas Ethos
The comparisons and allusions to the Vegas Golden Knights couldn’t have been more ironic. Jarmo Kekelainen and John Davidson installed a new head coach, implemented a new system, expressed their desire for playoffs, traded for veterans at significant cost and overvalued their prospects in the process en route to an offseason log jam.
The Vegas Golden Knights would not, under any circumstance, be labeled as an org that overvalues prospects. They did not draft and develop, they traded draft capital and future assets ruthlessly in the pursuit of victories.
Jarmo Kekelainen? Held onto Emil Bemstrom and Liam Foudy for fear they’d be claimed on waivers. Healthy scratched Andrew Peeke and Adam Boqvist. Couldn’t make a move because it was “cap-in, cap-out” something that has quite literally never stopped Vegas once.
Vegas ruthlessly moved on from mistakes. They acquired Tomas Tatar for a 1st, 2nd and 3rd. The next season, after he barely played in the playoffs, they packaged him with Nick Suzuki(!) and a 2nd for Max Pacioretty. Four seasons later, they moved Pacioretty for Future Considerations.
No fear, just deals, just winning. Just ruthlessly reshaping their roster to fit the conditions of play.
But again, while the comparisons to Vegas were, and continue to be, laughable, they aren’t the worst part.
Jarmo Kekalainen decided two seasons into a full teardown that he was sick and tired of losing. The offseason after finishing 2nd to last in the NHL, he believed the Blue Jackets should be close. The fans don’t want more draft picks, after all.
With these comments, he dramatically changed the lens with which fans viewed the season
All of this, the flaccid dealmaking, the heightened expectations, the complete change of system combined to create an all too predictable storm of anger and frustration. The Blue Jackets tried to skip “young and fun” and go straight to winning.
On-Ice Improvement?
To ascertain whether or not the Blue Jackets were improved from last season wouldn’t be a difficult task. In terms of standings points, they improved somewhere from 5 to 7 (64 or 66 points in 23-24 from 59 in 22-23) depending on the results of their last game. They went from second to last to fourth to last. Technically, that’s an improvement.
The Blue Jackets remained a bottom producing team (ranked 26th in GF at 5v5). Their 5v5 goals against (30th), powerplay (30th) and penalty kill (27th) were all significant weaknesses. Pretty much everything was bad, as it should be. This is a rebuilding club according to everyone except the front office.
As far as the more advanced analytics say the improvement looks a bit better. This team is now close, if slightly improved, from Brad Larsen’s first season as Blue Jackets Head Coach. In terms of xGF (5v5, score and venue adjusted, according to EvolvingHockey.com) the Blue Jackets ranked 17th, in terms of xGA they ranked 31st.
For possession metrics, the Blue Jackets ranked 13th in CF (once again at 5v5 score and venue adjusted) and 31st in CA.
In 2022-23, the Blue Jackets ranked 26th in xGF, 31st in xGA, 25th in CF, 31st in CA.
A baby-step forward in Pascal Vincent’s first season as head coach, driven primarily by offensive improvements, but undermined entirely by expectations and asset expenditure from the offseason.
The System
Pascal Vincent detailed early on what the Blue Jackets planned to do as a team. They planned to be connected, to track offensive teams through the neutral zone and to protect and attack the slot.
He wanted a team that drove North at Pace. Along with this new system and priority, growing pains were to be expected.
Over time, the tenor of the press conferences began to change. Players, mostly young after the first few months, were benched for turning the puck over or criticized for not blocking shots.
In any case, hockey is an incredibly connected game and though there was improvement in volume of shot attempts, which wasn’t completely carried in volume of quality, and the defense still struggled significantly.
The Model Performers
The Florida Panthers, the Vegas Golden Knights and the Dallas Stars are all fantastic possession teams. They grew through being purely rush teams, added players to help them take the more possession oriented steps and have now added defensive dimensions.
Roope Hintz and Jason Robertson were fantastic players but it wasn’t until Joe Pavelski and his puck recovering and play extending veteran wiles that they became what they are today. Since then, they’ve introduced Wyatt Johnston and Logan Stankoven on a line with Jamie Benn and they’ve added Matt Duchene as a cheap complement to Tyler Seguin on a more sheltered offensive line.
The Florida Panthers traded Jonathan Huberdeau for Matthew Tkachuk and piggybacked off of that roster composition change to become a dominant beneath the dots possession team (though it took them quite a long time to adjust and they barely squeaked into the playoffs).
Running underneath all of this possession oriented dominance is rush creation talent. It takes talent, and repetition, to enter the zone with consistency.
Go North at Pace
The Blue Jackets certainly entered the zone quite often this season. Unfortunately, their consistency and efficiency afterword were quite bad. Partially, this is an acceptable outcome.
The Blue Jackets really only created offense off-the-rush and even then they were largely inefficient there. The north mentality, the obsession with pace resulted in players rushing and playing at a predictable tempo without the elite skills and athleticism necessary to execute at complete top-speed (though it sure looks like Adam Fantilli will get there).
Through the neutral zone, the Blue Jackets attacked in straight lines and failed to chain together sequences of multiple passes en route to an improved scoring chance. The Blue Jackets weren’t attacking and exploiting vulnerable defenders and were generally pretty easy to push to the perimeter.
Even worse, they barely worked with their teammates.
The Necessity of Globetrotting
Kirill Marchenko, Yegor Chinakhov and Dmitri Voronkov wanted to pass to create defensive confusion and speed through chemistry.
Pascal Vincent didn’t want that because he wanted wins or, at the very least, shots on goal and he certainly didn’t want turnovers. He wanted to go North at Pace.
If this season was categorized as a learning season, these could have been teachable moments. Instead, they were insubordination.
According to Darryl Belfry, scoring goals in the NHL requires a level of teamwork and creativity that the Blue Jackets almost actively coached against.
“‘Team scoring creativity’ is how the group reads off each other to improve scoring chances. This starts with what the collective understating of how scoring chances are created, what we prioritize in chance generation, how a scoring position can be improved, and the need to pull the opponent’s goalie into a chess match. If you’ve done a good job in elevating the group understanding of scoring, then you can play chess, if you haven’t you’ll be playing checkers”
Quite often, it felt like the Blue Jackets forwards were playing checkers.
Rarely can a player dangle their way (or beat a defender through the neutral zone in a straight North footrace) into the middle of the ice and have enough composure and control to finish the play. Kirill Marchenko, Yegor Chinakhov and Adam Fantilli are among the most talented the Blue Jackets have in this regard, though Fantilli is the only perhaps complete player of the bunch.
Passing is pretty much the only way to get the puck into the truly high danger shooting opportunities. Otherwise, you’re pretty much entirely relying on rebound chances.
According to Ryan Stimson’s research, the likelihood of a shot becoming a goal is doubled, outside of rebounds, if it’s preceded by a pass to a teammate. The Blue Jackets are among the worst in shooting after teammate passes.
The Blue Jackets primarily shot off of carried pucks. Which is to say, the goaltender knew where the puck was coming from well before the shot left the stick. These types of shots are increasingly difficult to score from partially because the difficulty in accessing the interior of the ice without multiple passes in a sequence.
Stylistic Concerns
Pascal Vincent spent many early practices for the Columbus Blue Jackets trying to address a perceived deficiency in culture. Through the first few games, they just weren’t competitive enough and lost too many 50/50 puck battles.
Their system revolved around winning corner battles so that they could move the puck low-to-high and create odd numbers high in the zone. Unfortunately, they weren’t winning those battles so they had to work on those sorts of skills.
That partially explains the complete lack of forecheck/cycle chances. While upgraded rush chances through expert routes and area passing do tend to create higher danger chances they also tend to create easier recovery opportunities. The Blue Jackets targeted the retrievals instead of the pre-shot on- and off-puck movement
The Blue Jackets were too easy to read in the moments prior to the shot so they were working from behind on everything that came after, including puck battles.
Once in the zone, the Blue Jackets became too fixated on parking bodies in the net front and not enough worried about continuous motion in the zone. The focus was on the shots and the rebounds and not the rest.
I believe the North mindset and the lack of motion are interconnected problems. Going north and focusing on the speed in which you accomplish the task is putting players in situations where they aren’t trying to read the conditions of play and work to improve them. Instead, they fight against the grain and try a brute force approach.
Small area passing, clean puck handling, moving to make the next pass easy for your teammate and attacking the interior all but evaporated in favor of a singular focus on pace. These reads and situations bled into other offensive situations and undermined the Blue Jackets ability to consistently threaten defenses and cause problems.
Their inability to put defenses in bad situations also partially explains their inability to draw penalties: The Blue Jackets ranked 2nd to last in the NHL with 2.61 powerplay opportunities per game, the San Jose Sharks were the only worse team.
The net front, though strong under players like Boone Jenner and Dmitri Voronkov, lacked the movement necessary to create breakdowns. Furthermore, it made it too easy for opposing defensemen to get to the puck first.
Modern NHL teams are moving past the brutish net front ways of the past. Eating crosschecks is no longer a desired playstyle. The Dallas Stars, Carolina Hurricanes and even Florida Panthers are all employing players who are just as, if not more, effective at the net front despite staying in near constant motion.
Logan Stankoven, Wyatt Johnston, Sebastian Aho and Jake Guentzel are just a few of the cutting edge of the new style of net front players. The Blue Jackets are equipped to deploy that style but not if they continue to see the Boone Jenner approach as the North Star.
The Powerplay
The Blue Jackets absolutely abysmal powerplay in 2023-2024 is case in point. Going “north” does little to help you create on the powerplay. There’s nowhere for you to go and doing it fast doesn’t really help much. In fact, the team usually drops the puck backwards in order to build speed for an entry.
Now, players who go over the boards on the man advantage have to make completely different reads and almost entirely adjust their playstyle. They’re looking to attack defenders in set positions and try to break them down, they need poise, patience and confidence in both passing and stick handling. They need to diffuse and beat pressure instead of hoping to skip it.
It’s a pretty similar reason to why the Tortorella Blue Jackets struggled so much on the man advantage (go ahead and check out where his Flyers are too). The 5v5 style simply isn’t compatible, the players just don’t make the same reads and don’t get the same confidence making skilled plays under pressure.
In few words, good powerplays are the opposite of a “north” rushing style.
The Conservative Defensive Approach
As I’ve learned from studying the Florida Panthers, and other top defensive teams in the league this system, possession is literally half the battle. All of those offensive inefficiencies? They mean increased stress on your own defense. So too does the inability to recover pucks and extend possessions in the offensive zone.
As much as I think the style of play is a poor fit for the defensive personnel, the issue has more to do with the club’s location within their competitive arc than it does anything else.
The Blue Jackets center corps was Boone Jenner, Cole Sillinger, Adam Fantilli and Sean Kuraly. At a certain time, Patrik Laine was included in that group.
Regardless, it’s a far cry from the model teams of these systems. Vegas had Jack Eichel, William Karlsson, Chandler Stephenson and Nicolas Roy. Boston had Patrice Bergeron, David Krejci, Charlie Coyle and at times Riley Nash and Sean Kuraly.
The Blue Jackets had a plethora of young players, all of whom had a long way to go in terms of learning how to play efficiently. Possession consistency, especially on the back of learning a new system, just wasn’t ever going to be in the cards this season. Especially not when some of your veterans are Patrik Laine and Jack Roslovic.
Back to “Rob and Do”
Stealing any framework or defensive system without deep understanding of the techniques with which to coach it will always be a risk. The Blue Jackets often lamented that they were just employing a similar system to Vegas but that those veteran teams were more aggressive.
Unfortunately, that lack of aggression bled into every aspect of Blue Jackets defending.
Instead of collapsing space and time or pressuring opposing puck carriers, they gave them free reign along the boards and let them slow the game down. That’s a structural weakness of the system. Pack the crease and offer increased zone time in exchange.
Unfortunately, the Blue Jackets skaters didn’t execute the system properly. Instead of remaining as active defenders who were “looking for work” they mostly just stood next to players, watched the puck and assumed that was enough.
It very often was not.
Opposition players had time to plan out their attack, tire out the Blue Jackets defenders and orchestrate high quality offense.
That increased zone time also meant tired legs when trying to attack the other direction.
The Blue Jackets were the second worst team in terms of Failed Exits/60. A good chunk of the failed exits come from a poor start from a rusty Zach Werenski, a young/risky approach from Adam Boqvist and David Jiricek, and poor puck management from veterans like Erik Gudbranson, Damon Severson and Ivan Provorov.
The Blue Jackets forwards had plenty of contributions to make here as well. The young Blue Jacket centermen weren’t the most reliable in terms of supporting their defensemen and creating middle threat on breakouts. Fantilli, again, projects to be dominant here but it’s not a particular strong suit for Cole Sillinger or Boone Jenner.
The forwards, and defensemen, were behind the play. They didn’t have the same anticipation and comfortability in their reads that veteran teams who have been around the block have.
Hockey is a fast sport and automatic reactions to events comes with a better understanding of your systems and responsibilities. The adjustment period was always going to take time.
To model Florida again, it took them a miraculous winning streak at the end of the season for them to make the playoffs largely because they had to adjust their man-on-man system. It paid off for them.
Once again, the issue comes back to the expectation of improvement bringing instant wins is the problem.
The Penalty Kill
Similarly, the Blue Jackets Penalty Kill struggled mightily both before and after the absence of both Boone Jenner and Sean Kuraly. At first, the Blue Jackets sagged back and tried to block shooting lanes. Like their 5v5 defense, the lack of pressure simply resulted in more time to create and cleaner passes resulting in faster defensive breakdowns.
Later in the season, just before succumbing to injuries, the Blue Jackets took a more aggressive approach.
Miscast Veterans
Although there is tension from “competitive for playoff expectations” it still suits us to examine what exactly Jarmo Kekelainen was seeing when he made that distinction.
He was, it seems, counting on returns to form or even steps forward from players like Johnny Gaudreau, Patrik Laine, Cole Sillinger and Kent Johnson. Perhaps unheralded performances from defensemen like Ivan Provorov and Erik Gudbranson.
Roster construction is part of the reason that this season did not meet expectations, from any angle, and so too is not properly understanding what exactly they have.
Building through the wings has never been a successful strategy and both Johnny Gaudreau and Patrik Laine were highly paid wingers without centermen who could drive play alongside them.
Counting on young and/or converted inexperienced centers like Patrik Laine, Adam Fantilli and Cole Sillinger is a simple recipe for disaster.
Zach Werenski is an extremely talented offensive defensemen who did his right best to drag the team into something competent. He controlled center well but the best defensemen do that alongside a capable center and not completely in place of one.
Gaudreau
Johnny Gaudreau isn’t a do-it-all transition machine who can rely on speed and confident handling to get consistently great results in the way that Nathan MacKinnon, Connor McDavid, Nikolaj Ehlers, Jack Hughes or perhaps even Jake Voracek were.
At his peak in Calgary, his flaws and weaknesses were masked by Elias Lindholm and Matthew Tkachuk while his strengths were enhanced. He played with players to create offense instead of playing for them.
The Blue Jackets have asked him to spearhead transitions from inside the defensive zone whereas before he left early and threatened backlines.
Each year, Gaudreau has touched the puck in the D-zone more and entered the zone with control less and created less offense. These are related.
His shooting has dramatically decreased as his game began to orbit Boone Jenner’s. His shots/60 are 5.78, down from 8.23 at his peak with his normal numbers in the 7-8/60 range.
His shooting% is at a career low 5.2%, down from 15.76% at his peak (he’s only shot 4 seasons in his career below 10%).
All of these were better last season under Brad Larsen. His shots/60 were 7.84 and his shooting % was 8.28, which still would have been the second lowest of his career prior to this dreadful season.
Gaudreau is still a talented playmaker and creator of both transition and offense. In terms of primary assists at 5v5, Gaudreau still ranks 16th in the league. Even still, his game has been warped to the conservative Blue Jackets identity.
His giveaways/60 were always above 3 in his years with the Calgary Flames. With the Blue Jackets? Never above 2. It feels strange to criticize an obviously poor stat but there’s at the very least correlation between the risks he took and the offense he created. Now, he’s playing in fear of turnovers instead of accepting them as a natural part of a high volume play creation burden.
The onus is on Johnny Gaudreau to get better but the onus is similarly on the Blue Jackets to put him in the situations in which he thrived. The Blue Jackets may not have a Matthew Tkachuk or Elias Lindhom on the roster but that doesn’t mean Johnny Gaudreau should fundamentally change his game.
Before, Gaudreau was a transition and offense finisher and on the Blue Jackets he’s being asked to be a transition leader.
Laine
Patrik Laine was asked to play center. I believe he could work in that position, though it would require the renovation of certain habits. In his best form, Patrik loved tracking back and starting transitions. In the offensive zone, he floated around the high-ice until he found a quick strike chance from the middle of the ice.
The comparisons to Tage Thompson are perhaps a little lofty but that’s a player who uses his shooting and handling to dominate in the middle of the ice with the post-shot reach and tenacity to disrupt breakouts (a modern F3).
Laine isn’t quite there yet, in terms of clean-handling, puck protection and preternatural patience and his defensive awareness and anticipation would have to greatly improve in order for him to strip pucks on exits.
I still think he could work there but up and down deployment and healthy scratches are not how you set up such a positional change for success. Doubly compounded when your coach, potentially because of expectations set by management, doesn’t have a strong appetite for mistakes.
Patrik Laine’s chances of succeeding in the center of the ice were doomed before they started.
Jenner
Boone Jenner isn’t the do-it-all 1C that this organization seems to believe he is. He’s a throwback net front presence, and a valuable player do not get me wrong, that would be better served on a third line where creativity and connection aren’t such high priorities.
I have little appetite to strongly disparage a player who was the first Blue Jackets jersey I purchased as an adult but we simply can’t look past him getting 26 minutes in a game against the Ottawa Senators that the Blue Jackets lost 3-6.
And it’s within whatever mindset allowed that type of deployment to happen, within the pedestal on which Boone Jenner is placed, that we can start to divulge the issues plaguing the club. If Boone Jenner is the model of the Columbus Blue Jackets, they’ll only ever get so far.
Boone Jenner was the defensive backbone of the entire Blue Jackets and, historically, he hasn’t even been a particularly good defensive player. He competes hard, makes consistent reads and is decisive.
That’s a useful player. If he’s a first line center, or perhaps a center at all, that should be a signal to the management staff to look for better support down the middle or stop-gaps for the next wave.
He’s a good player, just not one to build a team around. He’s arguably not even a player that this team needs considering their inconsistency elsewhere around the lineup. His inability to pass the puck and build dangerous possession is a large reason for Johnny Gaudreau’s underperformance as well.
He will be a player that this team desperately wants when they are ready to win playoff games but will that be before his contract ends?
This is all removed from his status as Captain of the club. The Blue Jackets Front Office thought they had a large void of leadership in the post-Foligno era and they quickly moved to anoint Jenner captain and to sign Sean Kuraly and Erik Gudbranson as lieutenants.
All reports from my perspective say that he’s an excellent leader by example and an excellent person who helps unite the locker room. There isn’t any reason he has to be the first line center while doing so.
Even mentioning playoffs while he’s in that position is a disservice to the locker room.
Gudbranson
Erik Gudbranson was handed an absolutely shocking contract by the Blue Jackets in Unrestricted Free Agency. Since then, he’s been tasked with taking difficult matchups and keeping pucks out of his net.
Largely, he’s been a good fit for the defensive system. He anchors to a post, blocks shots and crosschecks anyone who come near the net front. He’s big and physical like many of the Las Vegas defensemen. He has a positive effect on Shot Quality against.
The problem with him is that he’s had an inverse effect on Shot Quality For.
When he is on the ice, he has a tendency to strongly dictate the outcomes in the offensive zone and his preference is on low quality shots from distance.
For these reasons, he isn’t necessarily the best insulator for young talent. Nearly every player had the puck less when they were played with Erik Gudbranson, evidenced by the With or Without You CF% measures.
He did defend the net front, which took an area of responsibility away from them, but if its not buying them more reps in creating offense, what is that really worth?
Similarly, his inability to start exits really harmed their ability to play hockey. He turned the puck over constantly, and was a large driver of the turnovers that resulted in blown leads. His panic threshold is quite low and he doesn’t give the young opportunities to make puck plays.
Therein might also be the problem. Perhaps Gudbranson’s lack of offensive ability, and the reliance on his chance suppression style, is a symptom. Perhaps the young Blue Jackets forwards needed to perform better defensively so that the coaching staff felt comfortable moving them away from Gudbranson.
Still, that makes the team feel a little performance oriented. Gudbranson, like Jenner, didn’t necessarily serve as an on-ice insulator but as a comfort blanket for the coaches. Whether that’s a Pascal Vincent issue or a roster construction issue isn’t exactly clear.
Mismanaged Youth
Pascal Vincent was tasked with changing the culture and, if we read between the lines, in winning games.
For fans who would have preferred the opposite, nothing is more egregious in a lost season than stuttered and inconsistent development practices. By playing the aforementioned veterans, thereby stealing reps and experience from the youth, the Blue Jackets were committing the most grave sins: short term thinking.
Jiricek
David Jiricek was, at least initially, sent to the AHL because of Kekelainen’s inability to move young players and clear the log-jam (or in adding to it over the offseason). Or perhaps he simply belong there and it was part of a long term plan.
Not an egregious mistake by any means. Jiricek had a phenomenally productive D+1 in the AHL but largely floated on powerplay production.
As I see it, you can:
Insulate the rookie with veterans and let them play their instinctual game at the NHL level (think Ryan Suter and Thomas Harley in Dallas, or Werenski next to Seth Jones)
Play them in the AHL, where they don’t need help playing their game, and ask them to work on deficiencies while logging heavy minutes and accumulating learning experience (think Simon Nemec in NJ or Harley prior to Suter in Dallas)
Zach Werenski was injured, David Jiricek was called up and he played his game. He was dynamic on retrievals, breakouts and in transition. He was aggressive in generating stops in the neutral zone. But at the same time, he made big mistakes. He was raw but talented. He was young and fun.
Nine games into his 2023-2024 season, he was told by Jarmo Kekelainen to “get a place” shorthand for “sign-a-lease you’re going to be with the team for good.” According to John Davidson, what they meant was that he might go down to Cleveland from time to time, especially if he’s not playing.
Well, what do you get when you mixed heightened expectations, a coach tasked with winning games and changing culture and a young, risk-laden but talented youngster? Drama, apparently. Jiricek wasn’t performing up to Pascal Vincent’s standards and as such was having his minutes cut.
He was sent down to work on his gap control, which is a legitimate issue for him at NHL pace but not something that would have been invisible in training camp, similar to Kent Johnson’s demotion earlier in the season to work on his strength.
In either case, these aren’t short term fixes solved by a couple of games in the AHL. There’s no reason either of them couldn’t be working on their strength, skating or “gap-control” while also in the NHL.
Instead, the Blue Jackets Head Coach and President of Hockey Operations went directly at David Jiricek even going so far as to compare him to a “thirteen year old girl who already wants a car” because he asserted that he was an NHL player.
These two old men completely dodged any accountability by placing the blame on Jiricek’s perceived impulsiveness and calling his character into question by suggesting he didn’t have the ability to delay gratification (quite ironic after their “tired of losing” remarks).
They called him up, they told him to get a place, he showed his NHL strengths and the Blue Jackets didn’t have the stomach for his game, at least partially because they thought they should be competing.
Johnson
Speaking of Kent Johnson, he was largely a better player this season than he was the last. He certainly struggled and didn’t quite look like himself for the season, mishandling pucks, falling over without contact, but that’s to be expected when the team switches to a system more focused on battle-winning and speed over possession in the neutral zone.
Once again, his treatment wasn’t inherently incorrect but the justification and the lack of responsibility for the performance of the player was confusing, at best. He wasn’t given veterans who could provide a platform for his game, he was played with Cole Sillinger and Emil Bemstrom, two other players who also were very much not established.
Moreso, above underperformance and above reasons for demotion was the focus on mistakes and negatives for two bright young players. The story that the management and coaching decisions told was one that focused on deficiencies. Kent Johnson isn’t strong enough to succeed in the NHL. David Jiricek’s skating isn’t good enough and he’s too risky on retrievals and breakouts.
Skating and strength aren’t going to be fixed in short order. The message, underneath the actual words, sent to these players was you aren’t good enough. Your strengths don’t matter because your weaknesses are too great and we need to win games. Said in different words, “I’m not confident in your abilities,” which makes the “confidence” justifications even more ironic.
The Effect of Expectations
The reason that, throughout this article I bring up “expectations” is that had they not been placed so high we could’ve had an entirely different frame of reference for this season. It wouldn’t have been about the mistakes or underperformance, it would have been about learning and growing.
The improvement from basement dwelling offense to middle of the road, despite lack of defense improvements, would have been a step on the way to improving quality.
All the noise about frustration and losing would haven’t been given the airspace, it would have been completely full of lessons and teaching moments.
This season could have been about the “process” rather than the results. Instead, we suffered through another disaster-class and it informed the handling of both veterans and youth.
Instead, whichever angle you take, you come out disappointed. Was this a rebuilding year, one built around giving the youth opportunity while accumulating assets? Then the acquisition of Ivan Provorov makes little sense as does the deployment and handling of young players like Kent Johnson, David Jiricek and potentially even Adam Fantilli.
If you thought the team had a quality core and was ready to take a step forward then the acquisitions of Ivan Provorov and Damon Severson make sense. The deployment of Johnny Gaudreau and Boone Jenner together in heavy minutes against bottom competition makes sense. But you’re still miserable because of yet another bottom five finish.
So what gives? Is it the system? The players? Is it all doomed?
The answer will ultimately be decided in the coming seasons. The Blue Jackets lack quite a few habits and skills that the good teams generally all have but I doubt that they are all completely bad players. Perhaps the next GM will prioritize sense and reads over footspeed and wrist shots and mold the team in that image.
It’s going to take some time and, perhaps, a novel approach. One removed from glorifying doing things the hard way and prioritizing work ethic and coaches who “grind”. Perhaps, as Damon Severson said, the fat needs to be trimmed. Perhaps along with it some genuinely high hockey sense veterans need to be brought in as sounding boards and mentors for the youth.
If the team genuinely wants to stick with the “Vegas” system, they would stand to learn from them. There’s no reason a specific system can’t work in the NHL, after all. The players, as poorly as they performed at times this season, will be better next season just because of improved understanding.
They’ll need to bring in players who are comfortable in that system and who can help drive learning from inside the room. Furthermore, they’ll need to bring in winners.
In many ways, easier said than done.
The Issues with Robbing Vegas
If John Davidson continues to follow blindly in the footsteps of the Vegas Golden Knights, if he continues to “rob and do” without understanding, if he continues to employ exclusively short term thinking, he could be putting the Blue Jackets in a perilous position.
So far, in his post-Kekelainen interviews he has used such verbiage as “take the next step” and in using picks like currency:
“Can you accumulate some more picks? When you accumulate picks and the hockey fan out there or Blue Jacket fan may go ‘I’m tired of picks I don’t want any more pick’ but you can use picks as currency. Picks are good when you try to make deals. Sometimes you have to throw a certain pick in to make a deal done”
It sounds like Davidson is intending to hire a General Manager who will be approaching the roster a strict improvement focus. That makes sense, there’s no reason to get worse and deals that improve roster talent and efficiency should always be pursued.
But if those deals continue to be of the Ivan Provorov, Damon Severson or Erik Gudbranson variety, we may have some trouble.
He’s already mentioned following in Vegas’ footsteps as a team that could turn things around quickly but also again in hiring a GM out of the Major Junior ranks. When asked the kind of profile that makes a general manager successful he only names Kelly McCrimmon, hired as AGM of Vegas from the Brandon Wheat Kings.
The smoke around the Blue Jackets organization suggests the person Davidson would be alluding to could be Mark Hunter of the London Knights. The Columbus Blue Jackets have a significant number of ties to the London Knights organization as it is already. AGM Basil McRae is a part-owner and AGM Rick Nash played his junior hockey there.
There would be a significant difference in the hirings of Kelly McCrimmon and Mark Hunter, namely that Hunter has already had a mediocre stint in the NHL and McCrimmon was hired first as AGM under Mark McPhee. If John Davidson once again “consults his network” and does the same “due diligence” that hired Mike Babcock, Mark Hunter is the path of least resistance and that should be something of concern for all Blue Jackets fans.
I don't know if this is all true, but one if the best explanations of how we got here as a franchise Ive read. Great job. Hopefully JD will get out of his own way this time when looking for a GM